Tag Archives: supply chain

AVIEN resource updates: 13th October 2018

Updates to Internet of (not necessarily necessary) Things

[Many of the Things that crop up on this page are indeed necessary. But that doesn’t mean that connecting them to the Internet of Things (or even the Internet of Everything) is necessary, or even desirable, given how often that connectivity widens the attack surface.]

The Register: It’s the real Heart Bleed: Medtronic locks out vulnerable pacemaker programmer kit – “The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is advising health professionals to keep an eye on some of the equipment they use to monitor pacemakers and other heart implants.”

Updates to Specific Ransomware Families and Types

David Bisson for Tripwire: New Sextortionist Scam Uses Email Spoofing Attack to Trick Users – “As reported by Bleeping Computer, an attack email belonging to this ploy attempts to lure in a user with the subject line “[email address] + 48 hours to pay,” where [email address] is their actual email address.”

In the Bleeping Computer article, Lawrence Abrams says: “In the past, the sextortion emails would just include a target’s password that the attackers found from a data breach dump in order to scare the victim into thinking that the threats were real. Now the scammers are also pretending to have access to the target’s email account by spoofing the sender of the scam email to be the same email as the victim.”

Updates to Mac Virus

Krebs/Sager interview on supply chain security (also published on this site).

David Harley

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Support Scams: the supply chain

Support scammers tend to be seen by people with a reasonable understanding of technology as being pretty low-grade, as scammers go.

‘Support desk’ scammers are sometimes subjected to humiliating telephone exchanges by people who take an understandable pleasure in wasting their time by pretending to be even dumber victims. They capitalize on the fact that scammers at this level are often easily confused if the victim doesn’t follow the script, and don’t have the technical knowledge to respond appropriately to reverse social engineering. Yet some of the tricks they deploy to convince victims that their systems are compromised so that they seek help from a fake helpline have become surprisingly sophisticated. As have the scammer organizations themselves.

For Malwarebytes, William Tsing offers an explanation as to how support scammers ‘can be sophisticated enough to set up infrastructure handling and network tracking, SEO cloaking, and payment processing.’ His suggestion is that behind the scam companies is a ‘criminal underclass’ offering prefabricated scam packages ‘that only require a credit card and ill intent to set up.’ And since most cybercrime works on a similar model, that comes as no surprise. In his article, he dissects a specific example of a Scam in a Box: Scamming as a service – seriously.

David Harley